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B.: The Scope of West Virginia Legitimatizing Statutes
STUDENT NOTES
policy could at least be in harmony with the judicial tendency
favoring the coal industry. Viewing the problem from the angle
of the interest of the state as a whole, these rules are eminently
proper: they will accomplish the purpose intended, namely, further
development of the oil and gas industry to the deeper producing
sands.
R. B. G.

THE SCOPE OF WEST VIRGINIA LEGITIMATIZING
STATUTESO
At common law only those children born or conceived in lawful
wedlock are legitimate1 and under early common law the illegitimate child had no right of support, of inheritance or even of a
name. 2 Legislators have done much to alleviate the condition of
illegitimate offspring, by enacting statutes declaring the child to
be legitimate and statutes conferring rights of inheritance upon
him. These statutes based on natural justice and on the natural
affections of the human heart have radically altered the position
of these unfortunates and brought American law into substantial
conformity with the Civil and Canon Law.3
Virginia was among the first states to enact legislation designed
to mitigate the harsh rules of the common law. In 1776 the General
Assembly appointed a Committe of Revisors4 to prepare changes
in the existing legal system and to Thomas Jefferson5 fell the task
of drafting the Law of Descents. The Revisors' Report was sub*Including W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 42, art. 1, § 5, which does
not legitimate but gives rights of inheritance through the mother.
1VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1936) 148; MADDEN, PERSONS &
DOESTIc RELATIONS (1931)
348; Robbins and Deak, Familial Property
Bights of Illegitimate Children: A Comparative Study (1930) 30 COL. L. REV.
348.
2 See MADDEN, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 348; Robbins and Deak, supra note 1,
at 310; Note (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 778.
31 BL. Comm. '454; Note (1916) 18 CoL. L. REV. 698; Note (1932) 45
HAZv. L. REV. 778. See Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. 355, 367 (Va. 1828); Garland
v. Harrison, 8 Leigh 368, 371 (Va. 1837).
49 HEN. STAT. (1821) 175 (Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Pendleton, George
Wythe, George lason, and Thomas Ludwell Lee were appointed on this committee but only the first three named participated in the actual work). See 1
WRITINGS op THOMAS JEFFERSON (Mem. ed. 1903) 62-67.
5 2 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Ford's ed. 1893) 195; 1 WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Mem. ed. 1903) 461; Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. 355,
373 (Va. 1828).
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mitted in 17796 but nothing was done in this respect until 1785,
7
when Jefferson's bill dealing with descent was enacted into law.
It included radical changes as to the rights of illegitimates as to
intestate ,succession.- With a few minor changes these statutes
have been carried into our Wgst Virginia Code, which provides:
"Bastards shall be capable of inheriting and transmitting
inheritance on the part of their mother, as if lawfully begotten. "9
"If a man, having had a child or children by a woman,
shall afterwards intermarry with her, such child or children,
or their descendants, shall be deemed legitimate.' 1
"The issue of marriages deemed null in law, or dissolved
by a court, shall nevertheless be legitimate.""An interesting problem as to the scope of these sections has
been raised by quaere in the recent West Virginia case of Pickens v.
O'Hara.'2 In that case T, the testator, by will established a spendthrift trust for his son A for life, and after A's death the principal
was to go "to any children he may have surviving him." If A
left no children the property was to go to the children of T's
daughters, X and Y. After the death of A, plaintiffs filed suit
claiming the trust property 3 as legatees and devisees under the
will of T, alleging that they were "children" born of a commonlaw marriage between A and B. It had been previously decided
by our court that the children of a common-law marriage are "the
issue of a marriage deemed null in law" and so entitled to "inherit"' from and through their parents;5 but this was the first
62 WMrTINGS OF THOMAS JEFPERSON (Ford's ed. 1893) 195; REPORT OF Com-

(For some reason the Assembly neglected the
oF REVisoRs (1784).
Report of the Revisors for some years; but finally in 1784 Madison succeeded
mIT'E

in getting 500 copies of it printed. These copies are now very rare.)
712 HEN. STAT. 138, 139 (1823); Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. 355, 372 (Va.
1828) ; Luther v. Luther, 195 S. E. 594 (W. Va. 1938).
s Davis v. Rowe, Garland v. Harrison, both supra n. 3; Luther v. Luther,
195 S. E. 594 (W. Va. 1938).
9 W. VA. REv. CoDE (Michie, 1937) c. 42, art. 1, § 5.
1o Id. at c. 42, art. 1, § 6 (under the original Virginia statute, recognition
of the child by the father was necessary and this was true in West Virginia
until the W. VA. REV. CODE (1931). See Revisers' note to this section.)
1 Id. at c. 42, art. 1, § 7.
12 Syl. 6, 200 S. E. 746 (W. Va. 1938) (Opinion published 200 S. E. 47 was
withdrawn by order of the court).
's The original trust property had been taken by the state of West Virginia
by a condemnation proceeding and this suit was to determine the right to the
proceeds of the condemnation and the proceeds from oil and gas leases.
14 Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 Atl. 948 (1892); Lyon v. Lyon, 88 Me.
395, 34 Ati. 180 (1896) (to inherit is to take as an heir at law, by descent or
distribution).
1 Luther v. Luther, 195 S. E. 594 (W. Va. 1938); Fout v. Hanlin, 113
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time that such issue had sought to assert a claim under a "will"
by virtue of the statute. The court decided the case on the ground
that no common-law marriage had been proved. The quaerc was
added as to whether, even if the marriage had been proved, the
plaintiffs would have been entitled to take under the testamentary
gift to "children". Thus the question is presented whether the
statutes set out above, apply merely to "descent" or whether they
extend to give rights under a will.
As noted above, historically, these statutes were enacted as
part of the laws of descent and distribution to provide for succession in the case of intestacy. The purpose was to bestow the
property of the alleged familial unit on legitimated offspring. The
old Virginia decision of Stones v. Keeling"6 has indicated the precise scope and purpose of the statutes:
"The act of 1785, it should be remembered, relates to the
disposition of property only; and proceeds to shew who shall
be admitted to share the property of a person dying intestate,
notwithstanding any former legal bar to a succession thereto.
And, in that light, the law ought to receive the most liberal
construction; it being evidently the design . . . to establish
the most liberal and extensive rules of succession to estates,
in favour of all, in whose favour the intestate himself, had he
made a will, might have been supposed to be influenced."
Again in the case of Garland v. Harrison the Virginia court
said:
"Our statute of descents is supposed to have been founded
on the natural affections . . . It takes men as it finds them;
and in default of their providing by last will and testament
for a division of their estates, it makes such a division amongst
those who are near and dear to the intestate, as he would
probably make if he were to make a will according to the

dictates of nature.'

'17

Some doubt is cast on this construction by the case of
Bennett v. Toler 8 in which there was a devise to a daughter for
life and on her death the property was to be equally divided among
her "children". It was there held that an illegitimate child would
W. Va. 752, 169 S. E. 743 (1933); Kester v. Rester, 106 W. Va. 615, 146
S. E. 625 (1929).
Italics supplied.
1s 5 Call 143, 144 (Va. 1804).
Italics supplied. See also Davis v. Rowe,
17 8 Leigh 368 (Va. 1837).
6 Rand. 355 (Va. 1828).
is 15 Gratt. 588 (Va. 1860).
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take with legitimates by virtue of the statute permitting bastards
to inherit from their mother. 19 The court recognized the rule that
the intent of the testator is the polestar of the interpretation of a
wil 20 but thought that the testator must be held to have intended
to include the illegitimate in view of the statute. A dictum shows
that the court considers that a fortiori the illegitimate would take
under a will in those instances in which the statutes 2 - provide he
shall be "legitimate". Thus, though originally a statute of descents
and distributions, it has seemingly been extended by judicial construction to permit those falling within its provisions to take under
a devise or bequest.
The authorities outside the Virginias apparently divide depending on the type of statute involved. If the statute merely
gives the bastard "some right of inheritance" as did the statute
involved in the Toler case, a majority of courts refuse to say that
such legislation affects the construction of wills23 and this is the
sounder view.24 This type of statute gives merely the right to
"inherit" and has absolutely nothing to do with testate property.
Those who claim under a will claim not as heirs, or by descent
but by purchase as devisees or legatees and unless they can bring
themselves within the provision of the will they should not take.
In view of the history and purpose of these statutes it seems clear
that the statute alone should not be enough to bring them within
the class of "children". Where the statute declares the child to
be "legitimate" most courts adopting a so-called liberal attitude
have extended the statute to the interpretation of wills.2" This
has been done although the statutes were enacted as statutes of
19 Now, W. VA. REV. CODE. (Michie, 1937) c. 42 art. 1, § 5.

20 Smith v. Bell, 31 U. S. 68, 8 L. Ed. 322 (1832); Runyon v. Mills, 86
W. Va. 388, 10 S. E. 112 (1920); 1 PAGE, WImLs (2d ed. 1928) § 808.
21 The decision can be rested on the fact that the daughter's illegitimate
child was known to the testator. His intent thus reasonably intended the child.
22 ow, W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 42, art. 1, §§ 6, 7.
23 Flora v. Anderson, 75 Fed. 217 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1896); Johnstone v.
Taliferro, 107 Ga. 6, 32 S. E. 931 (1899); Lyon v. Lyon, 88 Me. 395, 34
Ati. 180 (1896); Will of Scholl, 100 Wis. 650, 76 N. W. 616 (1898). Contra:
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Hodgkin, 48 R. I. 459, 137 Atl. 381 (1927);
cf. Hayden v. Barrett, 172 Mass. 472, 52 N. E. 530 (1899).
-4Note (1932) 45 HAmV. L. REv. 890.
22 Harness v. Harness, 50 Ind. App. 364, 98 N. E. 357 (1912); Gates v.
Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 57 S. W. 1065 (1900); Morton's Estate v. Morton,
62 Neb. 420, 87 N. W. 182 (1901); Matter of Sheffer's Will, 139 Misc. 519,
249 N. Y. Supp. 102 (1931) (statute said "shall become legitimate for all
purposes); of. Hicks v. Smith, 94 Ga. 809, 22 S.E. 153 (1895). A legitimated
child cannot take under a gift to "lawfully begotten children." Appeal of
Edwards, 108 Pa. 283 (1885); Honolulu Investment Co. v. Rowland, 14
Hawaii 271 (1902).
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descent. The courts following the prevailing view do so on the
ground that there are no classes or degrees of legitimacy and if
the bastard is made "legitimate" he is legitimate for all purposes.
However, these attempts to construe and interpret wills in terms
of descent statutes are fraught with danger and lead to confusion
no matter how laudable may be the purpose to benefit these unfortunates.2 The safer rule would seem to place the burden on the
illegitimate to show that the testator intended to include him in
the gift27 and not to attempt to interpret wills in terms of descent
statutes.
When the question next arises in West Virginia, our court
may feel "bound" by the Toler case but it is submitted that the
Toler case is unsound in its holding. As to the statutes like that
involVed in the O'Hara case declaring the issue to be "legitimate"
in view of the outside authorities, it is possible, though undesirable, that the court will allow the legitimated child to take
under a devise to "children".
In the case of bastards unborn at the time of the testator's
death as in the O'Hara case there is the further question as to
28
whether such a devise is against public policy.
A. L. B.
Note (1932) 30 MIcH. L. REv. 481.
Id. at 482. See Note (1932) 45 HAzv. L. Rmv. 890.
282 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §§ 607, 551; Kingsley v. Broward,
19 la. 722 (1883).
26

27
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